
## 01211

1962/11/17



Ecvember 17, 1962

Bear Adlat:

Here is a copy of a letter I have sent to Jack ReCloy, constituting his instructions for the senversation be is to have with Euspetsov en Sunday.

As you will see, your proposed letter to Ausmetsov was well received, but we think it would be better to smalt developments over the meekend before deciding just where a formal communication of this kind should fit into the scenario.

Wath warm regards.

Simperely.

Deen Rusk

Attachment.

The Honorable

Adlai E. Stevenson,

US. Representative to the UK 799 United Matieus Flaga

New York, New York.

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with your meeting with Eurasteev temorrow, sopies of the most recent communications between the President and librushebey.

be have just had a talk about your meeting tomorrow, in the E30 Executive Committee, and the following points represent the most useful guidance for that discussion.

For the moment, we should continue on our present source, which is to get Soviet assurances that the IL-20's will be withdrawn in a limited period of time, in return for which we would be prepared to lift the quarentine. This does not preclude a larger peakage later on with additional elements thrown in from both sides But we would such prefer to settle the bomber-quarantine deal before going on to other matters.

The President will be having a press conference on Tuesday. You should point out to amenetacy the difficult position in which the President will find himself if he has to formulate a public statement to the American people in the absence of Seviet agreement to get the bombers out of Cubs. Under these conditions, the President would undoubtedly have to say something that would sall into Question whether we really have a deal with the Seviets-and anything the President says along this line will hardly be helpful to Khrushchev at this juncture.

You should know, as the Soviets will be swere, that for the past the days we have not been making lowlevel flights ever Cube. While there is no objection to your saing this information in the discussion, you should serefully evoid ony implication that this is a guide to our future behavior, which it isn't.

The Eccorable

John J. Macley.

Orited States Hissian to the Griter bations,

799 U: Flaza. les Yora, Yes Yora.



2/1/a/19

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4. If Kunnelsev balks about the se-called "presecol" presented jointly by the Soviets and the Cabans you will, of source, say that it is obviously unasseptable, and not worth discussing. Is drags in all sorts of elements that ware not part of the understanding between the Fresident and Lhrushchev, and depands entirely on trustful good faith for its implementation. You might even ment be remark that while it may have been mesessary to ee-sign this eurious document in order to get Kikoyan out with a whole skin, they can hardly expect us to take it seriously.

5. The letter which idlai thereason suggested might be sent to function is an admirably clear peatatement of the U.S. position and you may bent to use the substance of it in your discussion, he have gune ever it here, and done a little editing their is reflected in the cepy I am attacking to this letter for your convenience, however, we think it would be best to skall the results of your Sunday welking and talking with Eurotsov, and the Seviet reply on the II-2/18 before writing Eurotsov a formal pargaining letter.

Good lucz with your talk, and let us know as soon as you can of any shift you perceive in the Soviet position, perticularly on the Ii-20's.

Mith were regards.

Simeerely,

Dogs Rusz

Attachments.

Copy te: Amb. Stevenson

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